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1. Introduction 
The achievement of the nominal and real convergence in the candidate countries 
to the euro zone represents a difficult task of the macroeconomic policy mix, the 
nominal and real convergence being two processes that influence one another. 
Thus, finding the balance between economic growth and the disinflation 
represents a challenge to the candidate countries (Nerlich, 2002). But, this isn’t 
the only contradiction between the convergence criteria, as the price stability 
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criteria too threaten the fulfilment of the other nominal convergence criteria. The 
greatest challenge in the countries acceding to the EMU is the simultaneous 
achievement of the price stability and exchange rate criteria. 
For these countries the inflation stability remains a crucial issue for the choice of 
the best possible monetary strategy for the accession to the euro zone (Beko 
and Festić, 2005). 
The countries that joined the EU have become members of the Economic and 
Monetary Union with a derogation concerning the introduction of the euro 
currency. The Maastricht Treaty specifies the criteria that a member state must 
fulfil upon the accession to the euro zone. In accordance with the prerequisites of 
the treaty, the monetary policy must have price stability as a fundamental 
objective. 
2. Literature review 
In the speciality literature there is not a monetary policy that matches all the 
candidate countries on the way towards adopting the euro currency. 
Choosing the monetary policy strategy depends on the characteristics of each 
economy. For instance, Estonia, a small and open economy and thus more 
vulnerable to the volatility of the exchange rate, has opted for the currency 
board. 
In the case of a country with a small, open economy, any fluctuation in the 
exchange rate reflects itself in a significant way in the price level (Coricelli et al., 
2006). Thus, a fixed exchange rate eliminates the influence of the exchange rate 
on the rate of inflation. 
Some authors (Buiter and Grafe (2002) or Coricelli (2002)) opt for the adoption of 
the fixed exchange rate conditions in these countries, because it increases the 
credibility of the monetary policies, and, also, consolidate the links with the EU 
and the EMU. 
For example, the success of targeting exchange rate in Cyprus is due, first, to 
the central bank’s credibility and, therefore, to the anchoring inflationary 
expectations. In order to ensure the sustainability of this regime, the authorities 
followed prudent economic policies using the developments in monetary 
aggregates, credit and the current account as warning indicators. 
Sepp and Randveer (2002) evaluate three alternative monetary policy strategies 
at the currency board in Estonia: Monica DAMIAN 
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1.  pegged exchange rate arrangement with inflation or output gap targeting; 
2.  floating exchange rate arrangement with inflation or output gap targeting; 
3.  floating exchange rate regime excluding any monetary policy target. 
Because the Estonian economy is very open and small, it is influenced 
significantly by the external environment, the inflation being an important function 
of the imported inflation. In this case, the inflation rate is the main monetary 
transmission channel, the tradable goods sector holding a relatively large share. 
Given the fact that the non-tradable goods sector is relatively small in Estonia, 
and the related demand of this sector is influenced by the interest rate, the 
effectiveness of this monetary policy instrument is low. The author concludes 
that the arrangement based on a currency board is the best monetary policy 
strategy for the Estonian economy, capable of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria. 
Examining the pros and cons of the currency board, Gulde et al. (2000) consider 
that the countries that apply this strategy are capable of fulfilling the convergence 
criteria.  
Opposing them, Salater’s opinion (2002) is that the fixed exchange rate regimes 
(including the currency board) are less effective than the inflation targeting 
strategy together with floating exchange rate in fulfilling the price stability criteria, 
because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the euro candidate countries. The 
author concludes that, in the case of a rapid economic growth, only a flexible 
exchange rate could fulfil the inflation criteria. Because the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect is absorbed by the nominal appreciation of the exchange rate, the risk of 
growing current account deficit appears. 
Choosing the monetary policy strategy depends on the characteristics of the 
economic and financial structures of the states, including the extent of economic 
openness. 
3. Empirical analysis of the viability of the monetary 
targeting strategy in Romania 
Adopting a monetary targeting strategy requires the fulfilment of two conditions. 
Firstly, the existence of a strong link between the monetary aggregate chosen as 
an intermediate target and the ultimate policymaker’s objectives (inflation rate) is 
necessary. Secondly, the monetary aggregate target must be well controlled by 
the central bank.  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
 
149
Some authors focus on the possibility of the central bank to control monetary 
aggregate chosen as target without making any reference to the money-inflation 
relationship, while others stressed the importance of the money-inflation 
relationship and ignored the analysis of the other condition. 
Most empirical studies demonstrate the viability of the monetary targeting 
strategy by modelling money demand function and testing the stability of 
parameters. 
In our opinion, to show that this strategy is a viable option it is necessary to 
examine both conditions. In the analysis we followed the methodology used by 
Boughrara (2004) who investigated (through cointegration tests and Granger 
causality) the conditions that must be fulfilled for making the strategy of targeting 
monetary aggregates more efficient. The results of this study show that M2 
monetary aggregate, albeit it is controllable in the long run, it is not perfectly 
controllable in the short-run and, accordingly, the M2 aggregate does not provide 
clear signals about the intentions of the policy makers. Regarding the 
relationship between intermediary and final objectives, econometric results 
showed the lack of them, both on short and long term. This can be explained by 
reducing the inflation rate to single digit levels, which means that the money 
growth rates lose informational content and become less useful indicators of 
monetary policy. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis is based on checking the existence of strong 
and predictable relationship between M2 monetary aggregate and inflation rate, 
(expressed by the consumer’s price indicator), on the one hand, and relationship 
between money base and M2, on the other hand. 
Choosing the analysis period was determined by the availability of data 
concerning the money base and the M2 monetary aggregate. Thus, the analysis 
was performed on two periods: 1994-1999 and 2000:01-2005:07.  
To check the two conditions of this monetary strategy we used the cointegration 
technique that shows the number of cointegrating relations and Granger causality 
tests that shows if a variable (y) is influenced by another variable (x). Granger 
causality tests show how much of the current y depends on its past values and 
then we see if adding the lagged values of the x  can improve the explanation of 
the variable y. X Granger causes y if x helps in the prediction of y. Accordingly, we 
will verify if M2 Granger causes inflation rate and M0 Granger causes M2. 
For performing the test we used monthly data concerning the monetary base, M2 
and CPI, and the data source is represented by monthly bulletins and annual 
reports of National Bank of Romania from the analysed periods. Monica DAMIAN 
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Firstly, we performed tests on stationarity of data series (Augmented Dickey 
Fuller). The results show us that inflation and monetary base are stationary in 
level, while the M2 money supply is stationary in the first difference for both 
analysed periods. The number of lags used in cointegration and Granger tests 
were chosen by estimating a VAR, and choosing the optimal number is 
accomplished by Akaike criterion. Thus, the number of lags used is 2 for both 
periods. 
In order to check if the M2 is related to the final objective, we analyzed the 
relationship on the long run between these variables using the Johansen 
procedure. The results (see Annex) shows that there is a cointegration 
relationship between M2 and the inflation rate for the period 1994-1999, at a 
significance level of 5%, which means that there is a causal relationship between 
the two variables, at least in one direction. The existence of a cointegration 
relationship suggests a strong long run relationship between two variables. 
Causality test suggests that M2 Granger causes an inflation rate with a 
probability of 7% during 1994-1999.  
If the period mentioned above justifies the effectiveness of the monetary 
targeting strategy, the same cannot be said about the period 2000-2005. The 
tests indicate that there is no cointegration relationship between M2 and the 
inflation rate. The lack of a cointegrating relationship and thus a causal 
relationship between M2 and the inflation rate suggests that the money supply 
has no influence on inflation and therefore the monetary aggregate can not be 
used as intermediate target for achieving the final objective of the National Bank 
of Romania. 
Using the same methodology, we checked the second condition, namely, the 
National Bank of Romania’s ability to control M2 through the monetary base.  
Applying the cointegration test to variables M0 and M2 for the period 1994-1999 
and 2000:01-2005:07, we see that there is no cointegration relationship between 
the two monetary variables (see Annex). The monetary authority can control only 
a part of the money supply, namely the monetary base, but there are other 
factors that are outside the control of the monetary authority. These factors are 
included in the money multiplier, which means that in the analysed period it was 
unstable. 
The econometric tests results justify the low efficiency of the strategy based on 
the monetary anchor, which led monetary authorities to opt for another monetary 
strategy. Low efficiency of this strategy was due to money demand instability and 
unpredictability (affected by structural and institutional changes and the  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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development of the macrostabilization process in the transition period), reflecting 
the volatility of velocity of money and money multiplier and thus the difficulty 
forecasting these variables. (Popa et al., 2009). 
 The instability of the demand for money may be reflected by the evolution of the 
money velocity. Money velocity for M2 aggregate monetary recorded a 
downward trend during 2000-2005, from 4.3 rotations/year in 2000 to 3.3 
rotations/year in 2005, reflecting increased demand for money (Figure 1). This 
trend is justified by high rates of economic growth, downward trend of the 
opportunity cost of holding money and consolidating disinflation. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Annual Report 2004, p. 241, Monthly Bulletins, December 2005, p. 
16, National Institute of Statistics, http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/index.ro.do, author’s 
calculations. 
Figure 1. Money velocity (M2) in Romania (2000-2005) 
 
Regarding the instability of the money multiplier, it was influenced, in particular, 
by the significant increase of the weight of non-government credit in GDP (from 
9.3% in 2000 to 21% in 2005) (Figure 2). This evolution was determined by the 
increase in bank liquidity (due to the reduction in the reserve requirements in lei 
from 30% in 2000 to 16% in 2005), intensifying competition in the banking 
system, the recovery in credit demand in the context of the economic growth, the 
reducing instability and lower interest rates. 
In our opinion, in the context of capital account liberalization (prerequisite for 
accession to the EU) the ability to control monetary aggregates reduces. Thus, to Monica DAMIAN 
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avoid sharp exchange rate appreciation, the monetary authorities’s purpose is to 
reduce the interbank market rate in order to diminish the difference between the 
internal and external interest rate. 
 
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/index.ro.do, National Bank of 
Romania, Monthly Bulletins, 2000- 2005, author’s calculations. 
Figure 2. The share of non-government credit in GDP in Romania (2000-2005) 
 
But, the reduction in interest rates has a negative impact on the money creation 
and hence on money supply. During 2000-2005, the interest rate recorded a 
downward trend imposed by increased risk to attract speculative capital, but also 
by dampening inflationary pressure. Thus, the reference interest rate fell from 
35% in 2000 to 9.68% in 2005, which determined an upward trend growth of 
money supply (Figure 3). 
Therefore, we consider that the use of monetary aggregates as an intermediate 
target in the context of the liberalization of capital flows and the necessity of 
currency stability is inefficient. 
The empirical analysis suggests that the strategy of targeting monetary 
aggregates could not be used in Romania, which required of another nominal 
anchor for achieving price stability. 
  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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%, in real terms, end period 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Monthly Bulletins, 2000-2005, author’s calculations. 
Figure 3. Annual growth rate of M2 in Romania (2000-2005) 
 
4. Limits of the use of the targeting exchange rate in the 
context of the euro adoption 
The New Member States of the European Union that have not yet joined the 
Euro Area are characterized by different arrangements on exchange rates. 
These range from currency boards in Bulgaria, Lithuania, conventional fixed peg 
arrangements in Latvia, managed floating (Romania) and independent floating 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland). These differences can be explained by the 
nature of the economic shocks and structural characteristics of each economy, 
such as size, openness, flexible labour markets. 
Although some authors support the adoption of flexible exchange rate on the 
way to the euro, three new member state of Economic Monetary Union have 
used targeting exchange rate in the period before euro adoption. But, these 
states have a very small economy (expressed as share in Euro Area GDP) and a 
relatively high degree of openness. 
Unlike them, Romania's economy is larger, being the third largest among the 
new EU member states, after Poland and the Czech Republic. Romania 
recorded an upward trend in the share in euro area GDP: from 0.65% in 2001 to 
1.33% in 2010. Regarding the openness of the economy, the Romanian Monica DAMIAN 
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economy is not very open compared to other states, registering the lowest 
values. 
On the other hand, to make the strategy effective, it is necessary to align the 
economic structures and trade with the Euro Area, as domestic interest rate is 
influenced by the one from the euro area. Romania has a different economic 
structure as compared to the Euro Area and therefore there is a risk of 
asymmetric shocks (Figure 4). 
In order to exercise a control over interest rates and inflation, Romania needs an 
independent monetary policy to react to domestic shocks. Therefore, under the 
liberalization of capital movement, we cannot adopt a fixed exchange rate 
according to the principles of the theorem “impossible trinity” highlighted by 
economists J.M. Fleming and R.A.Mundell. 
Although the use of exchange rate as an anti-inflationary anchor would have a 
positive impact on inflation, particularly by anchoring inflation expectations at 2% 
levels, it has certain limits. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes, author’s calculations. 
Figure 4. Structure by sectors of the economy in Romania and the Euro Area 
(2006-2010) (%) 
 
Adopting a monetary policy strategy based on the exchange rate was not a 
viable option for the central bank because of the gradual liberalization of capital 
movement, thereby undermining the effectiveness of this strategy (Popa et al., 
2009).  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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The governor of the National Bank of Romania, Mugur Isărescu, believes that 
the anchorage of the leu against another currency more stable in a form of 
crawling peg or currency board would not fit Romania during the pre-accession 
to the European Union because the latter requires a restrictive fiscal and income 
policy and the economy is extremely vulnerable to external shocks. If these 
measures are not applied, the currency board fails (Isărescu, 2003).  
According to this strategy, linking the national currency to the euro would involve 
an interest rate close to the Euro Area one, which was not suitable for the 
Romanian economy. In the context of high inflation rates, real rates became 
negative, and therefore the consumption was encouraged. 
 The option for a fixed exchange rate is not the best solution for Romania, due to 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The impact of the Balassa-Samuelson effect on 
inflation in the period 1997-2006 was between 0.69% (2005) and 4.76% (2000) 
(Dumitru, 2009). The author states that the results are correlated with labour 
productivity growth. Therefore, the higher the productivity differential is, the 
stronger the impact is. Also, a significant contribution to the size of the 
inflationary impact has the share of non-tradable goods in the consumption 
basket. In Romania, at present, they hold 18.33%, which means that the impact 
is relatively small, but we expect to increase their share due to real convergence 
and, therefore, the effect will increase. 
At a fixed exchange rate, the tradable goods inflation rate in our country is 
identical to the Euro Area, which means that inflation differentials with the Euro 
Area arising from the non-tradable goods prices increase at a higher rate. Figure 
5 shows the spread between domestic and foreign inflation rate of non-tradables, 
the highest inflation differential recorded between November 2008 - November 
2009 (over 2%). The existence of these differences are due to differences in 
productivity between sectors in Romania and the Euro Area. 
However, the financial crisis determined a downward trend in inflation in EU 
countries, while the impact was lower in Romania, justifying the increase in 
inflation differences mentioned above. 
These productivity increases are the result of the catching-up process that 
Romania registers in order to approach the Euro Area. The economic cohesion 
necessity is explained by the large differences in GDP/capita between Romania 
and the European average. Monica DAMIAN 
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Source: European Central Bank, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/, author’s calculations. 
Figure 5. The inflation rate of non-tradables in Romania and Euro Area 
 (2007:01-2011:05) 
 
To achieve the inflation criteria it is necessary to appreciate the leu against the 
euro, which means that tradable prices increase very little or decrease. However, 
in the 2007-2009 period, the national currency depreciated by 27%, thereby 
amplifying the inflationary process. 
Based on the relationship that determines prices of tradable goods in the country 
(RON/EUR exchange rate* prices internationally), we calculated the nominal 
appreciation needed to keep inflation at the level provided in the Treaty for the 
period 2007:01-2011:05. 
For calculations we used monthly data from the European Central Bank official 
statistics concerning the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the 12 
components of its share in the consumption basket, both for Romania and for the 
Euro Area and the rate inflation in the 27 EU Member States. 
To calculate the inflation rate for the two sectors, we used the classification made 
by Arratibel et al. (2001) of a HICP components in tradables and non-tradables. 
We used as the inflation target (inflation rate overall) the reference value, 
calculated as the average of the first three Member States with the lowest 
inflation rates plus 1.5%. Therefore, the inflation rate of tradables in Romania is 
equal with the difference between the overall inflation rate and inflation rate of 
non-tradables.  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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The results show an increasing trend of the leu appreciation against the euro in 
October 2008-November 2009 period, which coincides with a high inflation 
differential of non-tradables between Romania and the Euro Area (Figure 6). 
Therefore, as inflation differential of non-tradables will be higher, the fluctuation 
of the national currency will be higher. 
Because changes in the exchange rate are given by the ratio of consumer price 
index of tradable goods in Romania and the Euro Area and price fluctuations in 
this sector (tradables) in the Euro Area were very small, a significant influence on 
the currency appreciation was exerted by tradable inflation rate in Romania. In 
turn, this followed a pattern similar to the reference value criterion on price 
stability, as the non-tradable prices are more rigid. Consequently, currency 
fluctuations depend on the inflation rate in all EU Member States. 
In the analysed period, consumer prices in Romania were influenced, in 
particular, by the factors that had an impact on prices in all countries, but in case 
of internal shocks, exchange rate changes depend on non-tradable price 
developments, the reference value remaining relatively constant. 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/, author’s calculations. 
Figure 6. Nominal appreciation of the leu / euro  
(2007:01-2011:05) 
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Therefore, we consider that a fixed exchange rate is not suitable for the 
Romanian economy, because it is necessary to absorb the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect by nominal appreciation of the exchange rate that does not lead to 
differences as agains the euro area.The inflation criterion can be met through 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies that slow economic growth or the nominal 
exchange rate appreciation (Szapari, 2001). Therefore, the author believes that 
either criterion, inflation or the exchange rate, must be sacrificed at the expense 
of the other. Applying strict policy is not a solution because inflation sustainability 
is conditional on real convergence. On the other hand, one must avoid sharp 
exchange rate appreciation so as not to lose external competitiveness. 
Also, before entering the ERM II exchange rate stability is needed to determine 
the central parity. Consequently, we believe that meeting the Maastricht criteria 
requires a combination of these procedures and, therefore, a flexible exchange 
rate. 
5. The role of inflation targeting strategy in convergence 
with the Euro Area  
Romania’s accession to the EU implied a change in monetary policy to achieve 
inflation convergence. Orlowski (2001) believes that the transition economies 
need an autonomous monetary policy that allows for the stabilization of the 
inflation, characterized by transparency and forward-looking. From this 
perspective, the strategy of inflation targeting seems to be most appropriate for 
nominal convergence achievement. 
The main reasons for choosing the strategy of inflation targeting in Romania 
were (Isărescu, 2008):  
•  the necessity of the achieving a sustainable disinflation, also from the 
perspective of the convergence with the EU; 
•  unstable relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation; 
•  a peg exchange rate to another currency is extremely risky in conditions of 
trend appreciation determined by the convergence process and a progressive 
opening of capital account. 
Therefore, by switching to the new monetary strategy the convergence of the 
inflation rate with the euro area was pursued. In this sense, in order to analyse 
the convergence of the inflation rate in Romania, we applied the following 
relationship (Ben-David, 1996):   Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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) 1 , 1 , ( , , − Π − − Π Φ = Π − Π t EU t RO t EU t RO        (1) 
ΠRO, t ; ΠRO, t-1 – inflation rate in Romania in year t, t-1 respectively; 
ΠEU, t ; ΠEU, t-1 – the Maastricht reference value in year t, t-1 respectively ; 
Π – the convergence coefficient. 
Φ indicates the degree of convergence/divergence of inflation rate with reference 
value calculated according to the Maastricht Treaty. If Π < 1 we are in the 
presence of a convergence process and Π > 1 indicates the divergence of 
inflation. If the value of Π is less than 1, the degree of convergence is higher. 
The analysis is carried out in three periods:  
2001:01 - 2005:07 - the period before inflation targeting strategy,  
2005:08 - 2006:12 - EU pre-accession period in the presence of the inflation 
targeting strategy,  
2007:01 - 2010:12 - post-accession period. 
In order to estimate the convergence coefficient we used monthly data from the 
European Central Bank official statistics on the harmonised index of consumer 
prices (HICP) for the 27 European Union countries. 
The econometric results indicate that Romania is in process of convergence, 
both during the targeting of monetary aggregates and in the period immediately 
following implementation of new strategies (Π1 = 0.965894, Π2 = 0.947982), 
mentioning that period 2005 : 08 - 2006:12 is characterized by a greater 
convergence of the inflation rates. 
Contrary to expectations, in the 2007-2010 period there was an increase in the 
inflation differential, which it is highlighted by the value of Π = 1.007405. 
Figure 7 shows the fall of the inflation rate in Romania, as measured by the 
harmonized index of consumer prices and, thus, the approximation to the 
reference value calculated according to the Maastricht Treaty, the inflation 
differential reaching a minimum in March 2007 (1.17%) which justifies the value 
of Π. The increase in food and oil prices on international markets in the second 
half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 generated an upward trend in the inflation 
rate both in Romania and in the European Union. Monica DAMIAN 
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Source: European Central Bank, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/, author’s calculations. 
Figure 7. Convergence of the inflation rate in Romania (2001-2010) 
 
Since the share of food and housing in the consumption basket of Romanians 
differs from that in other EU countries, the result of the upward evolution of their 
prices increased the gap between inflation in our country and the Maastricht 
criteria. Consequently, the increase in the inflation rate faster in Romania than in 
other Member States is due to relatively large share of food in the consumption 
basket (37%) compared to countries that have the lowest levels of inflation in this 
period: Denmark, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal (approximately 12-
18%). Regarding the impact of oil prices, it is lower, the differences between the 
shares of housing are small, except Malta and Portugal where they have a value 
of 9% (against Romania – approximately 19%). 
The mitigation of the prices of raw materials on international markets since 
August 2008 has generated an increasing convergence of the inflation rate in our 
country over the next two months, followed by the inflation differential growth, 
and maintaining during 2009 at 5-6 %. Despite the strong contraction of the 
economic activity, inflation persisted in Romania, reflecting the existence of 
rigidities in the goods and labour market and higher excise duties on tobacco 
products. 
If in the first half of 2010 the inflation differential decreased as a result of slowing 
down the pace of contraction of the European Union countries and hence, an 
upward trend in the second half of the year, the inflationary gap returned to the 
2009 level due to the VAT increase in Romania from 19% to 24%. 
From above, we can say that the divergence of the inflation rate in the period 
from 2007 to 2010 is the result of factors that are outside the sphere of influence  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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of the monetary policy: the evolution of the international prices, the fiscal and 
income policy decisions. Therefore, in order to achieve the inflation target, is 
necessary the coordination of the economic policies. 
The challenge of the monetary policy in the context of the euro adoption is to 
determine the interest rate to fulfil both nominal and real convergence. Thus, a 
restrictive monetary policy in the presence of the inflationary pressure may result 
in the slowing down of economic growth, with negative impact on the real 
convergence process. 
Romania should register economic growth to diminish major differences in the 
GDP/capita between our country and the European average, being one of the 
real convergence criteria. The GDP/capita in purchasing power parity had an 
upward trend, reaching 45% of EU average in 2010. 
If we suppose an annual GDP growth of 5.5% in Romania, compared with an 
increase of 1.5% in Europe, the gap would be recovered in about 60 years, 
without taking into account the currency appreciation in real terms against the 
euro (Isărescu, 2004). The Governor of the National Bank of Romania states that 
economic growth of 7-8% per year would be unsustainable and would lead to 
overheating of the economy and recession; in addition it is inflationary. 
In our opinion, inflationary pressures are not generated by the growth rate of 
GDP, but the excess of current GDP above its potential level. The decrease in 
the inflation rate to mid-2007 was gradual, since a tighter monetary policy would 
have not allowed a real GDP growth.  
By adopting inflation targeting, it was intended to increase the credibility of the 
central bank, considered to be essential in achieving the target by anchoring 
effective inflation expectations on medium term. Thus, inflation expectations 
channel is the most effective monetary policy transmission channel. 
Gürkaynak et al. (2010) showed that inflation expectations were firmly anchored 
in the United Kingdom (a country with an explicit inflation target) than in the U.S. 
(a country with no such target). Also, the results indicated a higher volatility of 
inflation expectations in the United States. 
The economic agents and people form their inflation expectations regarding the 
inflation targets set by the central bank if they is credible. Otherwise, as in the 
case of Romania, the economic agents use inflation targets adjusted plus 2-3% 
in order to orientate their business, because in the past four years the central 
bank missed inflation target. Monica DAMIAN 
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Based on inflation expectations, employees require an increase in remuneration. 
If real wages exceed labour productivity growth, there will be an increase in unit 
labour costs that will be passed on to consumer prices. 
Also, inflation expectations influence real interest rate, as there is a negative 
correlation between the two variables. While maintaining the same nominal 
interest rate, the lower expectations are, the higher the real interest rate is, being 
thus an incentive for saving. In this case, the consumption is low, having a 
positive impact on inflation. 
Although in 2009 Romania experienced a severe contraction of the economic 
activity, reflected by increasing negative output gap, inflation rate remained 
relatively high. In this context, analyzing the aggregate supply curve (Phillips curve) 
that show the response of inflation to inflation expectations, the output gap and 
other shocks, other than those from exogenous variables: π = πt +1 + yt-1 + ε, we 
deduce that the high level of inflation is explained by inflation expectations. 
We notice that inflationary expectations are one of the key factors influencing the 
inflation rate. Therefore, in order to achieve the inflation target a firm anchoring 
of inflation expectations at a low level is necessary. 
Despite the limitations of this strategy, the inflation targeting is a viable 
alternative to achieve Maastricht inflation criteria. Therefore, the NBR intends to 
maintain it at least until adopting the Exchange Rate Mechanism II. 
6. Conclusions 
The application of monetary targeting in the context of accession to the 
Economic Monetary Union is limited by the liberalization of capital flows. For 
example, the reduction in the interbank interest rate imposed by the need to 
diminish the interest rate differential with the euro area determines an increase in 
money supply by multiplying the credits, the latter registering an upward trend 
since 2000. 
The econometric testing of the two conditions of this strategy indicates that 
monetary targeting cannot be used in Romania. Cointegration tests show that in 
the period 2000-2005 there was no cointegration relationship between the 
monetary base and M2 and between the M2 and inflation rate, which means that, 
on the one hand, the ability to control the monetary aggregate is low and, on the 
other hand, money demand is unstable. 
Due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, inflation criteria require the appreciation of 
the leu against the euro. On the other hand, the uncorrelation with the euro area  Evaluation of optimal monetary policy strategy in Romania 
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economic structures requires independent monetary policy to respond to specific 
shocks to the Romanian economy. Therefore, we may say that the selection of 
the exchange rate as intermediate target is not effective in the context of 
fulfilment of the convergence criteria. 
The weakening of the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation 
and the risks associated with using exchange rate as a nominal anchor in the 
liberalization of capital flows determined the monetary authorities to implement 
other strategies, namely, inflation targeting. 
Being characterized by transparency and forward-looking, inflation targeting is 
considered to be the most appropriate strategy for monetary policy to achieve 
nominal convergence. Analyzing the degree of convergence of the inflation rate 
in Romania for three periods (the period prior to the strategy of inflation targeting, 
the EU pre-accession period in the presence of the inflation targeting strategy 
and post-accession period), we notice that until the EU accession, Romania was 
in a process of convergence, the results indicating a higher degree of 
convergence in a period of inflation targeting. 
Increasing inflation differential in the period after the accession to the EU was 
due to factors that were not under the direct influence of monetary policy of NBR, 
such as: international prices increase and fiscal policy decisions. 
Despite the advantages of this monetary strategy, there still are challenges, one 
of them is establishment of the optim level of interest rate in order to achieve 
simultaneous nominal and real convergence. In our opinion, the interest rate 
adjustment must be made in accordance with the inflation rate. For example, the 
presence of inflationary pressures can be offset by slight increases in real 
interest rate, so that it allows the real GDP to grow. 
Although it has these disadvantages, the inflation targeting strategy ensures the 
fulfilment of the nominal and real convergence criteria and, therefore, it will be 
used at least until the adoption of the Exchange Rate Mechanism II. 
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